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Summary. — This paper proposes two theoretical considerations regarding Multilateral development banks (MDBs). The ﬁrst is that
MDB activities are increasingly driven by the growing economic strength of many developing countries. The second is that categorizing
MDBs according to the balance of power among shareholders helps explain why countries might prefer one or another MDB. We
compare three diﬀerent MDBs operating in Latin America—one dominated by nonborrowers (World Bank), another controlled by
borrowing countries (Andean Development Corporation, CAF), and a third more evenly split between borrowers and nonborrowers
(Inter-American Development Bank, IADB). Qualitative and statistical analysis suggests that demand factors play an important role
in MDB lending.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In academic literature as well as general public perception,
the World Bank and other Multilateral development banks
(MDBs) have long been viewed as domineering organizations
able to impose themselves upon developing countries. Since
the mid-1990s, however, a number of emerging market gov-
ernments have found themselves in strong ﬁnancial positions,
due to, among other factors, the huge rise in global private
capital ﬂows, high foreign exchange income from rising com-
modity prices and growing export industries, and much stron-
ger ﬁscal accounts. Whether these trends represent short-term
developments or a more fundamental shift in the world econ-
omy remains to be seen. But there is little doubt that the de-
mand for multilateral lending from many major developing
countries is undergoing a change. Economies such as China,
India, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru—which together
accounted for 44% of the World Bank’s loan portfolio in
2009—now have stable ﬁscal accounts, low public debt levels,
high international reserves, and well-established access to
international capital markets.
Little attention has been paid in the academic literature to
how this sea change in economic conditions for many develop-
ing countries might impact MDB lending. Is lending on the de-
cline for some MDBs, and if so, which MDBs are facing the
most serious drop in lending? What factors might lead a coun-
try to prefer borrowing from one MDB vs. another, when it
has a choice? Academic research is largely silent on these is-
sues, despite their far-reaching implications for the activities
of MDBs and on international development more broadly.
The literature instead has focused on how MDB lending deci-
sions are inﬂuenced by geopolitical considerations of powerful
shareholders, by bureaucratic pathologies within MDBs, or by
changing ideologies on development. All of these approaches
implicitly assume that lending ﬂuctuates only due to decisions
taken by the MDBs or their principal shareholders, while the
preferences of borrowing countries are not relevant. This may
have been justiﬁable in the 1980s, but is unlikely to be realistic
in the current global context.
In addition, existing research on MDBs focuses mainly on
the World Bank, with only an incipient (though fast-growing)
body of research on other MDBs such as the Inter-American
Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank (see,
e.g., Babb, 2009; Kilby and Bland, 2012; Gutner, 2002; Kilby,
2006, 2011; Neumayer, 2003, among others). More than 20
MDBs exist, and some are larger lenders to their particular
market than the World Bank. Do diﬀerent MDBs mediate
the interests of their country shareholders in diﬀerent ways?
How might the various shareholding arrangements among dif-
ferent MDBs impact their operations? Do borrowing countries
prefer working with some MDBs over others in diﬀerent situ-
ations, and if so, why?
This paper utilizes a new theoretical framework suggesting
that diﬀerences in lending volumes by various MDBs may be
partly explained by the balance of power between borrowing
and nonborrowing shareholders. Qualitative research indi-
cates that this balance of power directly shapes the terms of
the loans—i.e., ﬁnancial cost, bureaucratic procedures, and
safeguard requirements. Depending on economic conditions,
borrowing countries will put diﬀerent weights on these factors.
We thus hypothesize that lending varies systematically as a
function of both: prevailing economic conditions among bor-
rowers, and the type of shareholding arrangement in each
MDB. The three types of MDB shareholder arrangements
considered are: (1) domination by wealthy nonborrowing
countries (at the World Bank); (2) stronger but still subordi-
nate inﬂuence of borrowing countries (at the Inter-American
Development Bank, IADB); and (3) control by borrowing
countries (at the Andean Development Corporation, CAF).
The operational characteristics of each MDB derived from
these shareholder arrangements, we suggest, strongly condi-
tion the preferences of countries to borrow from them in dif-
ferent economic circumstances.
The statistical part of the paper examines lending by each of
the three MDBs for a common set of borrowing countries in
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Latin America during the period 1991–2010. We make use of a
multivariate, large N analysis in a panel framework with
observations across the diﬀerent borrowers and over time.
Based on Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation
(SURE), we compare the coeﬃcient estimates of the diﬀerent
MDB regressions to test our hypotheses on systematic diﬀer-
ences between the three cases. The comparison of only three
cases cannot prove a causal relationship between MDB gover-
nance structures, borrower preferences, and lending, nor can it
fully disentangle supply from demand side factors. However, it
allows us to test whether the lending patterns observed are
consistent with what our theoretical discussion leads us to
expect. The aim is to demonstrate that a demand-oriented
interpretation of MDB lending is at least as plausible as the
supply-side analysis prevalent in the current literature, an
interpretation that is further substantiated by qualitative evi-
dence. This points the way to further research to build a more
comprehensive and realistic model of MDB activities for the
current global economic context.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the
empirical puzzle to be addressed, and reviews relevant scholar-
ship on MDBs. Section 3 presents qualitative research on
MDB governance structures and loan characteristics, which
Section 4 then builds on to derive testable hypotheses. Sec-
tion 5 provides the econometric analysis of lending commit-
ments by the World Bank, IADB, and CAF in ﬁve Latin
American countries. Section 6 concludes.
2. EMPIRICAL PUZZLE AND THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK
Before moving on to analyze what might be driving varia-
tion in lending patterns by diﬀerent MDBs over time, it is use-
ful to ﬁrst consider whether this is something worth explaining
at all. It could be that lending remains relatively constant or
that it moves in ways that are relatively predictable and easily
explained. As can be seen in Figure 1, this is clearly not the
case, at least for lending by the three MDBs discussed here
in ﬁve Latin American countries. Annual lending commit-
ments ﬂuctuate widely year by year for each of the MDBs.
How is one to explain these patterns? Why since the early
1990s has the regional IADB lent consistently more than the
global World Bank? Why has lending by the relatively little-
known CAF grown so dramatically, to the point where it lent
more than either the World Bank or IADB in the last decade?
The existing academic literature posits a wide range of expla-
nations for MDB lending patterns, including realist consider-
ations of power politics and donor interest (Babb, 2009;
Dreher, Klasen, Vreeland, & Werker, 2010; Dreher, Sturm,
& Vreeland, 2009a, 2009b; Harrigan, Wang, & El-Said,
2006; Kilby, 2006, 2011; Thacker, 1999, among many others),
a rationalist focus on incentives among main actors in MDB
activities (Gutner, 2005; Mosley, Harrigan, & Toye, 1995;
Vaubel, 2006), or more sociology-based constructivist inter-
pretations of norms and staﬀ self-image (Babb, 2003; Barnett
& Finnemore, 1999, 2004; Weaver, 2008; Woods, 2006).
However, it is notable how little existing research considers
the point of view of the borrower when attempting to under-
stand MDB lending. The majority of research on MDBs pre-
supposes that all countries eligible to borrow from an MDB
will always want to do so, and the important question to be
asked is what factors might lead an MDB to award a loan
to a country or not. That is, they focus almost entirely on
the “supply side” of MDB activities. The analytical approach
of the studies cited above is to focus on the decision-making
process of the MDB in granting a loan—either among its
shareholders, within its staﬀ, or between the two—with the im-
plicit assumption that countries will always want the loans.
In light of the spectacular growth of many large developing
countries in recent years as well as the explosion of interna-
tional capital ﬂows, explanations of MDB lending that ignore
demand seems unlikely to be realistic now. Countries that
have been major borrowers from MDBs in the past, like Chi-
na, Brazil, India, Mexico, Indonesia, Peru, Turkey, and oth-
ers, have in recent years found themselves in much stronger
ﬁscal positions and also with a great many options for sover-
eign borrowing, often at very low interest rates and in domes-
tic currencies. MDBs still oﬀer these countries resources
generally at better ﬁnancial terms than they can get from the
markets, but the loans also come with a variety of strings at-
tached that these countries may object to. Hence, a more real-
istic and complete picture of how MDBs function in the
current global economic context requires understanding the
role played by borrower demand.
The impact of these broad economic shifts on development
lending is no news to the MDBs themselves, as evidenced for
example by numerous World Bank strategy papers and lend-
ing procedure reforms designed to maintain its attractiveness
as a development lender for middle-income country “clients”
(the term itself is revealing), as will be discussed further be-
low. Policymakers and journalists who follow development
issues have also noted these changes, and this is reﬂected in
some of the applied policy literature (see, e.g., Einhorn,
2006; Mallaby, 2005). However, academic research has as
yet not reacted in a signiﬁcant way to the increasing impor-
tance of borrower demand. The only studies we have found
to explicitly consider the role of demand are Ratha (2005)
and Knack, Rogers, and Heckelman (2012), both in relation
to the World Bank. 1
A second step when considering how demand impacts MDB
activities is to ask why countries might prefer to borrow from
one MDB vs. another, when they have a choice. Although the
World Bank has been the object of the overwhelming majority
of scholarly research on MDBs, some 20-odd MDBs exist in
the world, 2 and many of them lend more to their client coun-
tries than the World Bank. While academia has begun branch-
ing out beyond the World Bank, only a few studies have
compared governance structures of diﬀerent MDBs and at-
tempted to systematically test the impact of those diﬀerences
on operations (e.g., Gutner’s, 2002, book on environmental
Figure 1. Annual lending commitments by World Bank, IADB, and CAF to
Five Latin American Countries, 1990–2010. Source: Annual Reports of
World Bank, IADB and CAF, 1980–2009. Note: Five countries are Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.
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lending in Europe and the comparisons of donor inﬂuence at
diﬀerent MDBs by Kilby, 2006, 2011; Kilby & Bland, 2012).
Is the lending for some MDBs declining, and rising for others?
If so, why? Do countries view MDBs diﬀerently, and if so,
what factors might make them diﬀerent from one another?
This study develops a theoretical explanation to address these
questions based on the varying composition of MDB share-
holders.
Existing literature on shareholder power has focused almost
exclusively on the United States. However, as Lyne, Nielson,
and Tierney (2009) point out in relation to the World Bank,
the U.S. is far from being the only shareholder able to inﬂuence
an MDB. Gutner (2002) makes a similar point in her study of
MDBs in Europe, as does Copelovitch (2010) in his study of
the IMF. Lyne et al. (2009) highlight the “complexity” of prin-
cipals to help explain how policies evolve through the collective
preferences of all shareholding countries, as mediated by gover-
nance rules. Clearly the U.S. has disproportionate ability to
inﬂuence the actions of MDBs of which it is a shareholder.
But it is overly simplistic to suggest that formal voting rules
are merely a facade to disguise U.S. control and that other
countries have no role in inﬂuencing MDBs. 3 Academic re-
search into MDBs needs to ﬁnd ways to incorporate the role
of other shareholders beyond the U.S. or even the G7 to gain
a more realistic understanding of howMDB decisions are actu-
ally made and implemented.
We simplify the framework of complex principals outlined
by Lyne et al. (2009) by dividing shareholder countries into
those that borrow from the MDBs, and those that do not.
While all countries have their own particular interests and
agendas, the dichotomy between borrowing and nonborrow-
ing countries is particularly important in the context of an
MDB, deﬁning two major groups of shareholders that will
tend to have divergent interests on each MDB’s policies. Bor-
rowing governments will want MDBs to supply loans and
advisory services at as low a cost as possible, with minimum
bureaucratic hassles and requirements. Nonborrowing coun-
tries, by contrast, will seek to impose their own ideas about
development on borrowers, implement strict control on how
resources are spent, and reduce the risk of MDB ﬁnancial dif-
ﬁculties that they would have to pay for out of their guaran-
teed capital. The relative power of those two groups, we
suggest, is a critical feature shaping how each MDB operates
and the competitive advantages it has from the point of view
of borrowing countries. Clearly, the “borrowing” and “non-
borrowing” groups each comprise diﬀerent countries with dif-
ferent interests on many issues, and we do not mean to imply
that they operate in lock step. However, in the context of the
governance of an MDB, the interests of countries within these
groups tend to converge, as the qualitative evidence in the next
Section demonstrates.
Focusing on more than one MDB is obviously necessary to
compare the eﬀect of diﬀerent MDB governance structures.
The World Bank, IADB, and CAF each represent a diﬀerent
breakdown between borrowing and nonborrowing sharehold-
ers. The World Bank is controlled by wealthy nonborrowing
countries (63.1% of voting shares controlled by nonborrowers
in 2010), the IADB has more inﬂuence by borrowing countries
but is still ultimately under the ﬁnal control of nonborrowers
(50.02% of votes controlled by borrowers, but the U.S. with
veto power over capital increases, membership, and changes
to the Articles of Agreement), and the CAF is controlled by
the same countries that borrow from it (97.1% voting shares
controlled by borrower countries).
To facilitate the comparison, we focus on ﬁve countries in
Latin America—Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Ven-
ezuela—where all three banks have operated for over two
decades. 4 Because these are mainly middle-income countries,
the division of labor within the World Bank, between the
IBRD and the International Development Agency (IDA)
lending windows, is less relevant here, and almost all lending
that we cover in this study (over 90%) is nonconcessional. 5
The applicability of this framework to other MDBs operating
in other parts of the world is plausible, but would require fur-
ther research to test.
3. SHAREHOLDER POWER AND MDB
CHARACTERISTICS
The MDB characteristics of interest for this study are those
impacting the demand for loans on the part of borrowing
countries. Essentially this comes down to three sets of factors:
ﬁnancial cost of loans, speed, and ease of loan approval pro-
cedures and environmental/social safeguards. These factors
are prominent concerns in the internal strategy documents of
the MDBs themselves (e.g., World Bank, 2001a, 2004, 2007,
2010) and were brought up consistently as top priorities in
interviews with 22 borrower government oﬃcials in Colombia,
Ecuador, and Peru undertaken for this research. 6 Other issues
such as policy conditionality on budget support loans, techni-
cal assistance, and the style of staﬀ interactions with govern-
ment oﬃcials are considered much less important in
impacting borrowing decisions, according to interviews and
MDB strategy documents, and as such are not analyzed here. 7
Below we outline how the World Bank, IADB, and CAF
diﬀer in these characteristics based on the logic of their respec-
tive shareholder composition. Unless otherwise noted, infor-
mation in the subsequent Section is always the result of the
above mentioned interviews undertaken with 22 oﬃcials in
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru directly tasked with multilateral
borrowing, or interviews carried out with nine IADB share-
holder representatives (seven borrower, two nonborrower);
eight World Bank shareholder representatives (four borrower,
four nonborrower); seven CAF shareholder representatives;
eight IADB staﬀ; 12 World Bank staﬀ; and seven CAF staﬀ
(see Annex 1 for complete list).
(a) Financial terms
The cost of loans oﬀered by the three MDBs is largely a
function of the cost at which MDBs are able to raise money
through bond issues on international capital markets, which
is in turn passed through to the borrowing country along with
a small mark-up. This funding cost is, in turn, a function pri-
marily of the composition of countries backing each of the
MDBs and the amount of guaranteed capital they post, as
spelled out clearly in the reports of bond ratings agencies
(see, e.g., Fitch, 2010, p. 1; Standard and Poor’s, 2007, p.
7). 8 Ratings agencies consider only the guarantee capital of
wealthy countries to be reliable in the event of a crisis, and
as such the World Bank and IADB—both with most major
industrialized economies as shareholders—receive a AAA rat-
ing. The CAF, by contrast, has no major industrialized coun-
tries as members, which goes a long way to explaining its lower
rating (Moody’s, 2009; Standard and Poor’s, 2010). 9 As a re-
sult, the World Bank and IADB both borrow at extremely low
rates—although the former borrows slightly cheaper, due to
its global reach and perceived security—while the CAF pays
a premium. As an example, all three MDBs issued 5-year,
US$ bonds in 2011, at the following yields: World Bank
(IBRD) 1%, IADB 1.375%, CAF 3.625% (Bloomberg, 2012).
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Treasury oﬃcials in all three MDBs conﬁrmed in interviews
that both the IADB and the World Bank experience a “ﬂight
to quality” during times of capital market crises, lowering
their borrowing costs, while the CAF’s spread over the other
two increases (interviews with World Bank January 20, 2009
and November 17, 2009; IADB November 15, 2010; and
CAF December 14, 2010).
Because World Bank nonborrowing shareholders have a
number of reasons to generate net income each year, the
mark-up over funding costs at the World Bank is somewhat
higher than at the IADB. 10 The end result is that the loan
costs of the two MDBs are roughly equal, or the IADB is
sometimes slightly less expensive, while the CAF is consider-
ably more expensive, though improving over time as its own
ratings improve. CAF loans are still usually (but not always)
less expensive than private sources for government borrowing.
Loan maturities are also relevant for borrowers, and here
again the three MDBs fall along a continuum: World Bank
loan maturities are up to 30 years, the IADB 20–25 years,
and the CAF variable but averaging 14 years. 11 This again
is a direct result of the market perception that greater power
of wealthy shareholding countries is more creditworthy, thus
deﬁning the MDBs’ maturity curves in their capital market is-
sues, and hence the maturities they can oﬀer on their loans to
borrower countries.
Overall, then, the greater membership of nonborrowing
industrialized countries constitutes an advantage for an
MDB from the point of view of the borrower in relation to
loan ﬁnancial terms, as it improves the MDB’s access to inter-
national capital markets. Country ministerial oﬃcials uni-
formly stated that loan price and maturity were top
priorities when deciding on borrowing sources, and that this
constituted a strong advantage for the World Bank and IADB
vis a vis the CAF, and for all three over private market bor-
rowing. This dynamic is slightly reduced by incentives to gen-
erate net income to suit the interests of nonborrowing
countries, but only at the margins.
(b) Loan approval procedures and time 12
Oﬃcials in borrower governments who deal with all three
MDBs, MDB staﬀ, and internal MDB assessments all stated
that the World Bank imposes by far the most bureaucratic
hassles and longest loan approval processes of the three
MDBs, the IADB somewhat less and the CAF the least, and
that this pattern is a direct result of shareholder inﬂuence.
Although times vary depending on project type, the World
Bank generally takes 16 months from inception to ﬁnal board
approval (World Bank, 2007), compared to 10 months for the
IADB (IADB, 2011) and 3–5 months for the CAF (CAF staﬀ
and borrower government interviews). The World Bank gener-
ally requires at least four full in-country missions during pro-
ject preparation, compared to two or three for the IADB and
frequently just one for the CAF (World Bank and IADB oper-
ations staﬀ and borrower government interviews). Loan ap-
proval includes four major reviews for the World Bank
(World Bank, 2012), and although the IADB also requires
four reviews (IADB, 2012b), two of these are frequently “vir-
tual” and in all cases require shorter documents and prepara-
tion than at the World Bank (interviews, IADB operations
staﬀ). The CAF requires only two substantive reviews, one
of which is solely focused on the ﬁnancial impact of the loan
on the CAF’s own portfolio, and board approval considered
a formality (CAF staﬀ interviews). As well, all CAF loans un-
der US$75 million can go ahead without board approval
(Ibid).
The required procedures slowing down approvals of loans at
the World Bank are the result of nonborrowers seeking to con-
trol the way the MDB uses its resources, over the wishes of
borrower countries seeking faster loan approvals, according
to interviews with shareholders and staﬀ. As one long-time
operations staﬀer in the World Bank’s Latin America division
put it, “These ideas come from the Part 1 [nonborrower] coun-
tries, they’re certainly not the borrowers’ ideas—they didn’t
come to the Board asking for tighter restrictions on how we
do things” (World Bank interview, September 7, 2011). A
World Bank shareholder representative from Latin America
agreed: “It all comes from developed countries. With less than
30% of the vote, we are in a weak position to inﬂuence policy
design and deﬁne performance standards. The shareholding is
crucial to deﬁne the design of these policies” (World Bank
interview, December 14, 2011). This view was repeated by
other World Bank shareholders—borrower and nonborrower
alike—as well as World Bank operations staﬀ.
Loan approval procedures are similar at the IADB, but
IADB executive directors and staﬀ stated that greater voice
of borrowers on the IADB board led to a more compromising
attitude on the part of nonborrowers in designing more ﬂexi-
ble policies than at the World Bank. This, in turn, gives staﬀ
greater leeway to streamline procedures (virtual review meet-
ings, shorter loan documents, and fewer in-country missions),
explaining the advantage in loan approval speed by the IADB
despite formally similar procedural requirements. Ministry
oﬃcials in borrower governments uniformly stated in inter-
views that they ﬁnd the IADB more ﬂexible and willing to
adapt rules to country circumstances, compared to a much
more rigid, legalistic attitude on the part of World Bank staﬀ.
This more ﬂexible attitude is further strengthened by the fact
that a much higher proportion of IADB staﬀ are drawn from
borrower countries (68% at the end of 2009, according to
IADB, 2012a), meaning there is a much higher level of cultural
and even personal familiarity with government oﬃcials.
The CAF’s loan approval procedure is far faster and less
formal than either of the other two MDBs. Several oﬃcials
Figure 2. Interest rates of labor-based loans (All-in Cost). Source:
Methodology for annualizing fee costs taken from World Bank (2010).
Loan interest rate sources: World Bank (2011a), IADB (2011a), CAF
(2009). Fee sources: World Bank (2007, 2011b), Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank (2011b), CAF (2009). Notes: “All-in Cost” includes front-end
and commitment fees annualized over the life of the loan, as well as a
standardized disbursement and repayment proﬁle that is not exact. The
methodology is the same used by the World Bank Treasury department to
compare IBRD loan costs with other MDBs. A complete, comparable time
series of loan prices could not be constructed for all three MDBs because the
loan instruments oﬀered have changed over time.
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in borrower governments said that the CAF is willing to by-
pass most formal procedures entirely in cases of urgent need
on the part of a government, and that a loan can begin dis-
bursing in as quick as a month or 6 weeks if needed. Staﬀers
and shareholders alike say this organizational agility is directly
linked to the fact that borrowing country shareholders control
the institution, unlike the World Bank and IADB. “We are
much less rigid than the other multilaterals, which have certain
impositions from donating countries that we do not,” said one
operations staﬀer (CAF interview, May 25, 2009). This is
exempliﬁed in the structure of the CAF board. Rather than
a full-time, sitting board, as with the IADB and World Bank,
the CAF’s board meets only two or three times per year, and
much more authority is delegated to the CAF administra-
tion—in some sense, the principal-agent issue so much studied
in relation to the World Bank and other IOs is nonexistent at
the CAF, because of its unique shareholders composition.
Ministerial oﬃcials in all three countries reported that ap-
proval procedures and speed are important considerations in
loan decisions, because of the political importance of certain
projects, the opportunity cost of delaying projects of high eco-
nomic value and for dealing with emergency situations. As
such, the CAF’s much faster procedures are very attractive,
and the slightly higher speed and much greater ﬂexibility of
the IADB vis a vis the World Bank also constituted an advan-
tage (Table 1).
(c) Environmental and social safeguards
The “safeguards” are a series of procedures and require-
ments above and beyond national legislation for World Bank
and IADB projects that are deemed to present social and/or
environmental risks. As demonstrated in detail by, among oth-
ers, Wade (1997) and Shihata (2000), the safeguards were orig-
inally imposed on the World Bank by nonborrowing
shareholders, themselves pressured by environmental groups
and legislatures, against the wishes of borrower shareholders.
This dynamic has continued to the present. Shareholder repre-
sentatives from three Latin American countries at the World
Bank said that they opposed the push by nonborrowers to im-
pose safeguards above and beyond national legislation (World
Bank interviews, December 12 and 14, 2011; January 25,
2012). “It all comes from developing countries,” said one.
“The Nordic chair generally pushes a lot about performance
standards, France and Germany also push, and the United
States too depending on the project” (World Bank interview,
December 14, 2011). Nonborrower representatives inter-
viewed, including the U.S. executive director, all stated that
safeguards should be tightened further as a condition for their
countries’ continued support to the World Bank (World Bank
interviews January 13, 25 and 30, 2012).
The IADB’s safeguards are currently very similar to the
World Bank’s, and here again shareholder interviews point
to nonborrower shareholders as the driving force behind them,
with borrowers opposed (IADB interviews January 10, 13, 24
and 31, 2012). Indeed, the U.S. Treasury’s report to Congress
in 2011 justiﬁed its agreement to the capital increase in part by
noting that its requirement for the IADB to revise E&S safe-
guards had been complied with (U.S. Department of Treasury,
2011). However, a close reading of the policies reveals that
they are somewhat more ﬂexible for the borrower in several
key areas and require less bureaucratic oversight than at the
World Bank (see Table 2). As Nelson (2000) noted, “World
Bank adoption of a policy precedes the I[A]DB’s and creates
a standard . . .The I[A]DB adapts and revises the World
Bank’s global approach in ways that reﬂect the attitudes of re-
gional governments toward the new policies . . . [The resulting
policy] leaves broad discretion with the I[A]DB’s country oﬃ-
ces and borrowing government oﬃcials” (Nelson, 2000, pp.
419–420). A top IADB environmental staﬀer agreed with that
assessment, saying, “Compared to the World Bank, we are less
procedural” (IADB interview, December 7, 2011). The World
Bank’s own internal surveys have also found that borrower
countries ﬁnd its safeguards signiﬁcantly stronger than the
IADB’s (World Bank, 2010).
The fact that borrower shareholders control the CAF en-
sures that it imposes no binding external constraints on envi-
ronmental and social aspects of project lending, beyond
Table 1. Loan approval procedures and times
World Bank IADB CAF
Approval time 12–16 months 7–10 months (2007–09) 3–6 months; 1.5 if urgent
Number of missions  Identiﬁcation  Identiﬁcation  Identiﬁcation/appraisal
 Pre-appraisal  Appraisal  Negotiations (often VC)
 Appraisal  Negotiations (often VC)
 Negotiation
Number of review phases  Concept  Eligibility (often virtual)  Business Committee
 Quality Enhance  Quality/risk (often virtual)  Loan and Invest Committee
 Decision  Operations  Board (for larger loans)
 Board  Board
Caveats Decision meeting can be skipped
for low-risk invest loans since
2009 (but rare due to
risk-averse staﬀ)
 Missions faster than WB (example:
negotiations ½ day vs. 2–3 days)
 Missions faster than either IADB or WB
 Shorter project documents
and reading time before
meetings than WB
 Loans below US$20 mln approved
by operations VP
 Loans below US$75 mln approved by
president
 Nonresident board meets 3–4 times/year;
can approve loans by email
Source: World Bank (2012), IADB (2011d, 2012b), staﬀ interviews.
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national laws. The CAF has no formally deﬁned safeguard
policies, only a brief list of 14 principals (CAF, 2007).
According to former CAF oﬃcials as well as an independent
NGO report (Bank Information Center, 2008), the CAF has
no safeguard policies, but rather makes decisions on a
project-by-project basis. One high-level CAF staﬀer said poli-
cies “are not imposed from the outside by third parties, they
are Latin American policies designed for this context . . . Our
policies don’t respond to the policies of nonborrowing coun-
tries like the other banks” (CAF, 2011).
Ministerial oﬃcials from borrower governments said that
safeguard variations between the MDBs were less of a priority
to them than price and approval speed, but that they are par-
ticularly problematic in major infrastructure projects, espe-
cially transportation infrastructure. As a result, the CAF’s
policies were much more appealing for these types of projects,
while the IADB was slightly easier to deal with compared to
the World Bank. 13
4. HYPOTHESES
This section summarizes the evidence described above on
the link between shareholder composition and the characteris-
tics of MDB loans of interest to borrowers, and uses it to build
testable hypotheses. The over-riding premise here is that the
factors described above combine to form an overall “price”
faced by borrowers for MDB loans, which includes both ﬁnan-
cial costs as well as bureaucratic hassles. The assumption driv-
ing our hypotheses is that borrowers prefer this “price” to be
as low as possible. Interviews with borrower government oﬃ-
cials substantiated that loan price, approval procedures, and
safeguards are key factors impacting their decisions on which
MDB to borrow from, depending on the country’s economic
circumstances. Based on the link between shareholder power
and these operational characteristics, we formulate our
hypotheses.
Because the World Bank is dominated by nonborrowing
industrialized countries, it can access capital markets at highly
favorable terms for its bonds, and hence has a steady stream of
lendable capital at terms well below what many borrowing
countries normally get on private markets. At the same time,
nonborrowing countries impose more onerous project over-
sight requirements as well as multiple layers of bureaucracy
and slow loan approval time. These nonﬁnancial aspects to
World Bank loans are, on the whole, unappealing to borrow-
ing countries, and can outweigh the low ﬁnancial cost, notably
when countries’ alternatives for sovereign ﬁnancing increase
and when their borrowing needs decrease. For Latin American
countries that, on average, tended to have increasing access to
alternative sources of ﬁnance from 1990 onward (from both
private capital markets as well as new bilateral lenders such
as China and Brazil), this should lead to a long-term trend
away from World Bank lending. Over and above that long-
term trend, during years when a country is doing relatively
better they would be even more inclined to move away from
the World Bank. The opposite should be true during years
when they are in a relatively more constrained economic and
ﬁnancial situation. When a crisis becomes global, tight inter-
national capital markets and reduced country access to private
ﬁnancing should further strengthen the attractiveness of the
World Bank due to its unparalleled access to capital markets
and the “ﬂight to quality” of bond buyers.
The borrower-dominated CAF, by contrast, has weaker and
more expensive access to capital markets. Hence the ﬁnancial
terms of its loans are less attractive than the World Bank’s,
especially in a time of economic turbulence. On the other
hand, because it is controlled by the very nations it lends to,
the CAF has no incentive to impose the safeguards that many
borrowers object to in World Bank operations, nor any reason
to build up the bureaucratic layers of checks and balances that
slow down loan approval. This limited bureaucracy is attrac-
tive to borrowing countries, although the higher cost of loans
is a drawback. Typically, the stronger the macroeconomic sit-
uation in a country, the more important a country will con-
sider the former as compared to the latter. As a result, one
can expect that the long-term trend of lending by Latin Amer-
ican countries will move toward the CAF as opposed to the
World Bank. Over and above the long-term trend, countries
will react year-to-year relatively more in favor of the CAF
in better economic situations, and relatively less so in worse
situations. In times of crisis, however, CAF borrowing costs
on private markets are likely to rise considerably due to its
own higher cost of funding, thus reducing the attractiveness
of CAF loans. Moreover, in times of crisis, the needs of indi-
vidual countries may surpass the loan amounts the CAF can
provide.
The IADB occupies an intermediate position between the
World Bank and the CAF in terms of shareholding structure,
with borrowers controlling a slim majority of voting power on
Table 2. Comparison of environmental and resettlement safeguards
World Bank IADB CAF
Environmental safeguards
Experts Independent experts for assessments
and advisory panels
No stipulation; advisory panel not required National systems
Consultations Includes NGOs Only “aﬀected parties” National systems
Bureaucracy Separate regional safeguard team
(often conﬂicts with project team)
Project team only, no separate specialists National systems
Resettlement safeguard
Trigger Caused by or related to project Only directly caused by project National systems
Consultations Required “Where possible” National systems
Dispute resolution Third party mechanism required Not required National systems
Resettlement type Land-based resettlement preferred
for those with land-based livelihood
“Appropriate” resettlement National systems
Bureaucracy Social Development Unit, Resettlement
Committee, Legal
Project team only, no separate resettlement
specialists
National systems
Project completion Not until resettlement completed No requirement National systems
Source: World Bank (1999a, 1999b, 2001c, 2001d), IADB (1998, 1999, 2006, 2007), CAF (2007).
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individual loan approvals, but with industrialized nations led
by the US able to veto any changes to IADB policies and orga-
nizational structure. As a result the IADB enjoys some of the
same advantages as the World Bank in terms of access to cap-
ital markets and low cost, and also some of the disadvantages
such as more bureaucratic loan approval procedures and safe-
guard policies demanded by nonborrowers. However, the
greater power of borrowing shareholders as well as the fact
that most IADB staﬀ are from the region’s political and eco-
nomic elite, loan preparation and negotiation is smoother
and bureaucratic requirements less rigid. Hence, over the long
term, the IADB is expected to see lending rise more (or de-
crease less) than the World Bank. However, it should not rise
as much as for the CAF. Similarly, IADB lending is expected
to react in between the other two MDBs during short-term
yearly ﬂuctuations of a country’s economic and ﬁnancial cir-
cumstances. During crisis years, IADB lending should increase
more than CAF lending, but less than World Bank lending.
We can sum up the above discussion with the following test-
able hypotheses:
1. Under conditions of generally positive ﬁscal and devel-
opmental trends in their borrowing countries, as a long-
term trend the World Bank (nonborrower dominant
MDB) will experience a decline in lending, the CAF (bor-
rower dominant MDB) will experience an increasing trend,
and the IADB (nonborrower predominant) will ﬁnd itself
in between.
2. Around this longer-term trend, countries will gravitate
toward World Bank lending and to a lesser degree the
IADB, and away from the CAF, as their circumstances
worsen in the short term, and vice versa when short-term
conditions improve.
3. In times of global crisis, the World Bank and, to a lesser
degree the IADB, will show an increase in lending, while
CAF lending will increase less or even decrease.
5. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
To test the above hypotheses, we need to compare the over-
all trends of lending by the three diﬀerent development banks,
and the reaction of their lending to diﬀerent economic and
capital market conditions, controlling for possibly interfering
variables. Our dependent variable is lending commitments
by each of the three MDBs to the ﬁve countries of Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela for the period
1991–2010. 14
To test the ﬁrst hypothesis on the correlation between MDB
lending and the long-term economic development in the region
(in all its diﬀerent dimensions), we simply introduce a linear
time trend (Year). To assess the second hypothesis related to
the speciﬁc inﬂuence of variance in individual economic vari-
ables over and above this general trend, we utilize measures
of GDP per capita, international reserves, and investor rank-
ings. GDP per capita and reserves are intended to proxy
how badly a country might need external resources or not,
and the investor index gives a sense for a country’s access to
private capital markets to ﬁll those needs (alternative supply).
For the latter, we use the Institutional Investor index of sover-
eign risk, which is also employed by Ratha (2005) and Knack
et al. (2012) for similar purposes. 15 We include a separate indi-
cator variable for the global crises in 1997/98 and in 2009, with
the aim of verifying the impact of global capital market tight-
ening as described in the third hypothesis.
Our control variables include the inﬂation rate as a measure
of economic governance, and the number of (relevant) votes
along with the US in the UN General Assembly for political
closeness to the largest shareholder in the World Bank and
the IADB. In the existing literature, such variables reﬂecting
the governments’ general political stance as well as their eco-
nomic policies have frequently been shown to inﬂuence
MDB lending (Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Dollar & Levin,
2004; Dreher et al., 2009a, 2009b; Kilby, 2006, 2009, 2011,
Thacker, 1999, among others). We also include IMF lending
as an alternative source of funding, and the countries’ popula-
tion as a simple scaling factor. All variables and data sources
are described in Annex Table A1.
We acknowledge at the outset that the variables included in
our empirical model can a priori reﬂect supply and demand
side considerations. In fact, previous studies advancing only
supply side arguments face exactly the same dilemma, but this
tends to be overlooked and is usually not even mentioned. To
address the issue explicitly, we present both perspectives in
Table 3, with the coeﬃcient signs that each interpretation
would predict. For all relevant explanatory variables, the sign
of the estimated coeﬃcient indicates whether the demand or
supply perspective is more plausible.
For example, our hypotheses predict a negative correlation
between reserves and World Bank lending in a given year, due
to the country demanding less World Bank loans. However,
from a supply side perspective, the World Bank could be ex-
pected to increase the loan oﬀer because the country is a more
attractive low-risk borrower. For poor African countries, an
alternative, need-driven supply argument may be plausible,
but none of our interviews and other existing information from
within the MDBs suggests that this would be the case for the
middle-income countries and years in our sample. Since the
early 1990s, the World Bank has produced numerous strategy
reports and undertaken various procedural reforms speciﬁcally
for the purpose of maintaining lending relationships with
wealthiermiddle-income countries, which theWorld Bank fears
no longer want to work with them. This includes the middle-in-
come country assessments and strategies (World Bank, 2001b,
2004, 2007), studies on the costs of safeguard policies (World
Bank, 2001a, 2001c), the country systems pilot (World Bank,
2005), investment lending reform (World Bank, 2009) and the
recent Program for Results instrument (World Bank, 2011c).
The drive to continue lending to wealthier borrowers—in part
to protect the quality of the loan portfolio—is also noted by
Knack et al. (2012), andwas raised repeatedly in interviews with
World Bank staﬀ and shareholders.
The design of our model—looking at the comparisons be-
tween the impact of relevant explanatory variables the lending
of three diﬀerent MDBs (rather than just one)—further helps
us bring out these demand eﬀects more clearly. 16
While the coeﬃcients for economic variables will give more
or less plausibility to either the demand or the supply side
arguments, the situation is more diﬃcult to interpret for pol-
icy variables. A country that is politically opposed to the
U.S. may either prefer to borrow from the CAF, or other-
wise, the World Bank and the IADB may be more reluctant
to lend. For example, Ecuador has not borrowed from the
World Bank since 2009. Many existing studies would inter-
pret a correlation between Ecuador’s U.N. voting against
the U.S. and no lending as a sign of U.S. inﬂuence at the
World Bank. However, interviews with Ecuadoran govern-
ment oﬃcials and World Bank staﬀ in the Ecuador oﬃce
make it clear that in fact the World Bank would like to re-
start lending, but the country prefers not to take out loans
for its own political reasons. Since the distinction is impossi-
ble to ascertain in a statistical framework, we use these vari-
ables only as controls.
148 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
Table 3. Variables and expected impact: demand vs. supply
Variable Demand-side interpretation Supply-side interpretation
Year (linear trend capturing general economic
development)
Countries become economically and ﬁnancially more self-
reliant and have less need for funding from development
banks. Because of the diﬀerences in bureaucratic hassle
factor (World Bank most, CAF least, IADB between), the
World Bank should be clearly on a negative trend (), the
CAF positive (+); IADB in between (+/)
Countries become safer borrowers. This increases the
willingness to lend for all banks, or at the least maintains
steady trends due to need to generate loan income based
on MDB ﬁnancial model. ! expected coeﬃcient: + or ﬂat
[An alternative interpretation that would predict the
opposite sign suggests that MDBs may prefer to supply to
economically needy countries. However, substantial
evidence from documents and interviews clearly
contradicts this view (see also Knack et al., 2012, p. 171),
particularly in middle-income countries such as those in
the sample]
Investor ranking (ﬁnancial situation as
perceived by investors)
As above As above
Reserves (% ext. debt) (debt sustainability) As above As above
GDP per capita (economic situation) As above As above
Global crisis (global ﬁnancial downturn) Countries have greater demand for MDB loans due to
tight international capital markets
Banks attempt to stabilize the ﬁnancial situation
However, CAF lending becomes more expensive as
compared to IADB and World Bank lending because of a
greater diﬀerence in funding costs in a crisis. Thus, World
Bank and IADB lending should go up (+), CAF lending
should go up less or decrease (+/)
However, since the crises are global, the World Bank as a
global bank may have other priorities than lending to
Latin America. In this case the coeﬃcient for the World
Bank might not be clear (+/). CAF also unclear (+/)
because it may face restrictions in access to capital markets
because of its lower rating, and hence may be forced to
restrict loan supply; IADB lending should increase (+) as it
has a regional role to fulﬁll and should not be restricted by
capital markets due to AAA rating
UN voting with US (political closeness to US) Banks are more attractive lenders for countries that share
their main policy orientation. Expected coeﬃcient for
World Bank (+), for CAF () and for IADB in between (+/
)
Borrowers are more attractive for banks that share their
main policy orientation. Expected coeﬃcient for World
Bank (+), for CAF () and for IADB in between (+/)
Inﬂation (%) (bad economic governance from
World Bank perspective)
Governments with high inﬂation rates will avoid the
World Bank, which would interfere with their economic
policy choices. The same might be true for the IADB, but
is certainly not true for the CAF. Expected coeﬃcient for
World Bank (), while for CAF lending should not be
aﬀected (+/). IADB in between (+/)
World Bank will lend less to governments with high
inﬂation rates, which indicate nonorthodox economic
policies. The same might be true for the IADB, but is
certainly not true for the CAF. Expected coeﬃcient for
World Bank (), while for CAF lending should not be
aﬀected (+/). IADB in between (+/)
IMF lending IMF lending could reﬂect situations of greater need, but
also the existence of alternative funding to satisfy given
needs. Expected eﬀect unclear
IMF lending could reﬂect situations of greater need, but
also the existence of alternative funding to satisfy given
needs. Expected eﬀect unclear
Population Higher number of inhabitants increases the demand for
funding. Expected eﬀect (+)
Higher number of inhabitants increases the supply of
funding as a response to need, but also because large
countries are typically politically important. Expected
eﬀect (+)
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Conceptually, our argumentation is based on the idea that
for any Latin American country, borrowing from the World
Bank, the CAF, and/or the IADB must be considered as joint
decisions, because these banks operate in a common market.
This has consequences for the choice of our regression model.
If lending by diﬀerent MDBs is not determined independently
from each other, this information can be taken into account to
obtain more eﬃcient regression estimates. We therefore
use Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation (SURE)
that allows error terms to be correlated across equations.
In addition, SURE is convenient to compare the three
individual MDB cases, which are necessary to examine the
role of the three governance types. We do so by testing the dif-
ferences in the coeﬃcients of crises, booms, and trend vari-
ables for the diﬀerent MDB regressions using (one-sided)
Wald tests.
The ﬁrst three columns in Table 4 show the SURE regres-
sions using (1) World Bank lending, (2) IADB lending, and
(3) CAF lending as the dependent variables. The remaining
three columns show the diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients for the
diﬀerent banks and the signiﬁcance of these diﬀerences accord-
ing to the Wald tests.
The ﬁrst line, for the linear trend, provides partial support
for the hypothesis related to long-term trends in lending
choices. On average over the 20-year period and the ﬁve coun-
tries considered, and at given levels of the other variables,
World Bank lending has declined by US$11 million per year,
IADB lending has declined by US$21 million, and CAF lend-
ing has increased by US$20 million. These eﬀects are statisti-
cally signiﬁcant for IADB and CAF. We hypothesized that
the coeﬃcient for IADB should be greater (more positive)
than for World Bank, and that the CAF’s should be greater
than for both other banks. The diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients
for World Bank and IADB indicates a stronger (here: less neg-
ative) time trend for World Bank, but this unexpected result is
nonsigniﬁcant (column 4). Conversely, and as expected, the
CAF shows a signiﬁcantly more positive time trend than either
the World Bank (column 5) or the IADB (column 6).
These results indicate that over time, along with the overall
growth and stabilization of Latin American economies, CAF
lending increased steadily, while World Bank lending declined.
The even stronger negative trend observed for the IADB was
unexpected both theoretically and based on the graphical illus-
tration in Figure 1, which suggests a similar trend between the
two MDBs. This implies that the development represented in
the graph is partially driven by some of the other variables.
In any case, from Figure 1 we know that the absolute level
of IADB lending remained above World Bank lending
throughout the period, apart from 3 years. In fact by 1991
the IADB was already lending more in absolute terms than
the World Bank, which could indicate that the dynamics be-
hind the ﬁrst hypothesis may have already played out before
the time period analyzed here in relation to the IADB vis a
vis the World Bank. Alternatively, it could be that the diﬀer-
ences in loan approval procedures and safeguards between
the World Bank and IADB (imposed in both by nonborrower
shareholders, recall) are too marginal from the point of view
of the borrower to make much of a diﬀerence between the
two MDBs, compared to the far more borrower-friendly pro-
cedures at the CAF.
Over and above the general trend, the speciﬁc economic
variables related to the second hypothesis show the expected
results for the investor index. A one point increase on the
investors’ ranking scale (0–100) leads to a US$20 million de-
crease in World Bank and a 13 million decrease in IADB lend-
ing. At the same time, it leads to an US$8 million increase in
CAF lending. As with the linear trend, the diﬀerences in coef-
ﬁcients between the CAF and the other two banks have the ex-
pected sign and are strongly signiﬁcant. These outcomes are
very diﬃcult to reconcile with a supply-side perspective. They
clearly indicate a preference for the CAF whenever a country
is rated highly so that it has a generally better access to the
capital market. While the diﬀerence between World Bank
and IADB now also points in the expected direction (IADB
taking up an intermediate position between World Bank and
CAF), it is again nonsigniﬁcant (column 4).
Table 4. Determinants of lending and diﬀerences between MDBs, 1991–2010
Coeﬃcients for Method: SURE (1)
World Bank lending
(mio USD)
(2)
IADB lending
(mio USD)
(3)
CAF lending
(mio USD)
(2)  (1)
Diﬀerence
IADB-World Bank
(3)  (1)
Diﬀerence
CAF-World Bank
(3)  (2)
Diﬀerence
CAF-IADB
Year 10.88 21.13* 20.38** 10.25 31.26** 41.51***
(0.19) (0.09) (0.05) (0.30) (0.02) (0.00)
Investor ranking 19.87* 12.89** 7.62*** 6.98 27.49** 20.51***
(0.10) (0.04) (0.00) (0.32) (0.02) (0.00)
Reserves (% ext. debt) 7.90* 1.00 5.56** 6.90** 13.45** 6.56
(0.09) (0.81) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.15)
GDP per capita 0.19* 0.18*** 0.04 0.01 0.23*** 0.22***
(0.06) (0.00) (0.26) (0.47) (0.00) (0.00)
Global crisis 167.08** 113.83* 119.89*** 280.92*** 47.19 233.72***
(0.02) (0.09) (0.00) (0.01) (0.25) (0.00)
UN voting with US (share) 672.17*** 177.64 44.91 849.81* 717.09** 132.72
(0.01) (0.67) (0.87) (0.05) (0.04) (0.37)
Inﬂation (%) 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
IMF lending (mio USD) 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.08***
(0.50) (0.54) (0.55) (0.49) (0.25) (0.00)
Population (mio) 57.72** 50.11*** 11.79 7.62 45.94** 38.32**
(0.02) (0.00) (0.26) (0.39) (0.03) (0.01)
Notes: Robust p-values in parentheses. For diﬀerences, they are calculated testing one-sided hypotheses using Wald tests (***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1). Country ﬁxed eﬀects are included but not shown. All right-hand-side variables except “Year” are lagged by one year. There are 100 observations
(5 countries  20 years) in each regression. R2(within) for each of the regressions individually is 25%(1), 15%(2) 45%(3).
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The other economic variables (GDP per capita and reserves)
do not show the expected results. To some extent, this may be
due to the multicollinearity between the diﬀerent variables. 17
When taking out the time trend and the investors’ ranking,
neither GDP per capita nor reserves are signiﬁcant for the
lending of any of the three banks. When we only enter the
investors’ ranking, the positively signiﬁcant reaction of CAF
remains unchanged. This implies that access to the capital
market matters most for our demand-side arguments. The
more traditional economic indicators fail to show the expected
eﬀect—at least as long as we control for individual country
ﬁxed eﬀects (FE). 18
The eﬀect of the global crises variable also shows some
unexpected features. Ceteris paribus, the eﬀect of a global cri-
sis reduces rather than increases World Bank lending, by an
average amount of US$167 million. We believe that this can
only be interpreted as a supply restriction, given that the
World Bank as a global player faced simultaneous demands
from all parts of the world during these situations. This was
particularly true during the 1998/99 crisis (see Figure 1), where
the World Bank apparently focused more on lending to the
hard-hit Asian economies. The IADB as a regional develop-
ment bank shows the expected signiﬁcant and positive coeﬃ-
cient, indicating that as a regional MDB it stepped in to ﬁll
the gap left by the World Bank’s supply restrictions. While
the CAF is also a regional MDB, its own cost of funding
would have spiked during the crisis (it is negatively impacted
during capital market tightening, unlike the other two MDBs,
as discussed in Section 3), explaining the negative coeﬃcient.
This is in line with our hypothesis that in times of economic
crisis, countries shift their demand toward MDBs with lower
lending cost.
Coeﬃcients for the political control variables correspond
to the typical ﬁndings in the literature, which enhances
our conﬁdence in the correct speciﬁcation of the model
overall. UN voting along with the US signiﬁcantly increases
the average loan volume extended by the World Bank (as
found by Anderson, Hansen, & Markussen, 2005; Dreher
et al., 2009a) while it is insigniﬁcant for the IADB (as found
by Kilby and Bland, 2012). The large coeﬃcient for the
World Bank refers to the hypothetical situation that a coun-
try that never voted along with the US then always votes
with the US. The coeﬃcient indicates that, on average, a
country that increases the share of its votes along with
the US by 10 percentage points would receive US$67 mil-
lion more in World Bank loans. As with the IADB, the
coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant for the CAF; and both regional
development banks diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the World Bank
but not among themselves. Similarly, only World Bank
lending reacts negatively to higher inﬂation, but the positive
reaction of both the IADB and CAF suggests a possible
substitution eﬀect—although as stated previously whether
this is driven by supply or demand considerations is not
clear. Regardless, even though diﬀerences between the
MDBs related to inﬂation are signiﬁcant, the coeﬃcients
are very small, implying that the impact of this policy var-
iable is minimal (at least at the relatively low inﬂation levels
prevalent during the period under analysis).
The control for alternative funding by the IMF is insigniﬁ-
cant throughout, possibly due to mutually oﬀsetting eﬀects
(e.g., IMF funding could show the need for resources, but also
that existing needs are being covered from this alternative
source). At the same time, the control for population appears
important, at least for the World Bank and the IADB,
although country FE should already capture the bulk of the
variance in population size.
We check the robustness of these results in a variety of ways.
Annex 2, Table A2 presents some alternative speciﬁcations
using per capita lending rather than the absolute volume of
lending, using tobit regressions, and using a speciﬁcation in
logs. To save space, we use joint regressions across all three
banks (with MDB-speciﬁc country eﬀects) rather than SURE
regression, and we specify interaction terms for all variables
with an IADB and a CAF dummy respectively. While this
does not provide us with a signiﬁcance test for all diﬀerences
between the three banks, it shows whether and to what extent
IADB and CAF lending reacts diﬀerently from World Bank
lending. Results of regressions that appear most convincing
in econometric terms do conﬁrm our results, and diﬀerences
between the diﬀerent speciﬁcations ﬁnd plausible explanations.
Annex 2 provides a detailed account of the regressions pre-
sented, discusses the pros and cons of each speciﬁcation, and
compares the results. We also test for serial correlation, for
which we ﬁnd no evidence whatsoever (neither using a
Wooldrige test, nor a Baltagi-Li test). 19
All in all, our results appear relatively robust and point to a
signiﬁcant role of demand-side factors playing out in diﬀerent
ways for the three banks, in line with the theoretical arguments
on their governance structures. Of course, as an initial explor-
ative analysis, this study had to concentrate on a clearly de-
ﬁned region and period, and thus a limited number of
relevant banks. To ascertain if the same dynamics hold true
in other regions of the world and with other MDBs, it would
be necessary to expand the analysis. This would also mitigate
the problem of just including a single case for each of the three
governance structures. Annex Table A5 illustrates that other
MDBs exist with similar distributions of votes as in the three
banks considered so far—some of them with considerable
lending volumes. While an extension to these banks is beyond
the scope of this paper, it should be possible to use this classi-
ﬁcation for further research testing the external validity of our
results.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Starting from the observation that lending by diﬀerent Mul-
tilateral Development Banks (MDBs) has developed in strik-
ingly diﬀerent ways over the last two decades, this paper
assesses the determinants of lending from a demand-side per-
spective, which has thus far been largely overlooked in the lit-
erature. Based on interviews with bank and country staﬀ and
oﬃcials, as well as on a multivariate statistical analysis, our re-
sults broadly conﬁrm the theoretical argument that demand
for loans depends, among other things, on the governance
structures of the MDBs, notably on the balance of power be-
tween their borrowing and nonborrowing shareholders, and
the implications of this governance structure for loan cost
and bureaucratic procedures. Borrowers weigh these factors
diﬀerently depending on economic circumstances, so that the
relationship between economic conditions and lending can
be used to (indirectly) assess the link between MDB gover-
nance structures and demand for lending.
The results of this study do not (and were not expected to)
reject the notion that supply-side dynamics play a prominent
role in shaping MDB lending patterns, and in fact our ﬁndings
in relation to global crises and policy variables substantiate
supply-side impacts. But the evidence indicates that the over-
whelming focus on supply-side considerations in the existing
literature can and should be usefully supplemented with de-
mand considerations, taking into account the preferences of
borrower countries. This is particularly true in light of the
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changing economic panorama for many middle-income devel-
oping countries that have heretofore been among the largest
MDB borrowers.
Our analysis covers three MDBs with diﬀerent governance
structures: (i) domination by nonborrowers (World Bank), (ii)
domination by borrowers (Andean Development Corporation,
CAF), and (iii) more balanced control by both borrowers and
nonborrowers (Inter-American Development Bank, IADB),
and ﬁve Latin American countries that had access to lending
from all three banks. While this initial analysis is thus limited
to a speciﬁc region and a selection of banks, it might be interest-
ing to extend it to other MDBs and a higher number of coun-
tries, especially as the relevance of this topic for individual
banks can be expected to rise. Lending is the core business of
MDBs, required for their own access to ﬁnancial resources,
ensuring their survival, and providing a certain degree of inde-
pendence from their shareholders. Thus, changing demand for
MDB loans must be expected to aﬀect their behavior.
The issues raised in this paper are, of course, not only
of interest to academia, but to the broader development
community, especially those shaping policy toward and within
MDBs. If demand for sovereign lending continues to evolve in
the ways described in this paper, it will have major implica-
tions for the multilateral aid framework, and raises a number
of questions. Do MDBs compete with one another and private
capital to make loans in a more demand-driven environment,
and if so, how and with what developmental impact? Can the
World Bank’s ﬁnancial model—based on income derived
mainly from loan proceeds—survive with a relatively low
and maybe declining long-term lending trend, punctuated by
sharp spikes in lending during crisis times? Are shareholders
willing to modify the World Bank’s ﬁnancial model to pay
for public goods (knowledge, aid coordination, and crisis
assistance) in spite of declining loan income, and if so, how?
Should regional and sub-regional MDBs take a more pre-emi-
nent role, as some observers (Grabel, 2012; Griﬃth-Jones,
Griﬃth-Jones, & Hertova, 2008) have suggested? These are
all issues that policy-makers are likely to face with growing ur-
gency in coming years, and are relevant topics for future re-
search.
NOTES
1. Another exception is Mosley et al. (1995), who analyze in detail the
bargaining between borrower governments and an MDB (the World
Bank), but in the speciﬁc context of adjustment lending in the 1980s, where
the governments in question badly needed resources and had few other
options.
2. An MDB can be deﬁned as an international organization that: (i) is
created by international treaty among sovereign nations, which are its
shareholders; (ii) has the mission of promoting economic development in
less developed countries; (iii) makes loans largely (but not necessarily
exclusively) to sovereign governments; (iv) is for the most part ﬁnancially
self-suﬃcient, without requiring regular contributions from shareholding
countries; and (v) raises money for lending primarily on private capital
markets, with the guarantee of their shareholding countries. See IDS
(2000).
3. A number of studies have pointed to the informal inﬂuence of the U.S.
in inﬂuencing the IMF, World Bank, IADB and Asian Development
Bank, including Kapur (1999), Woods (2006), Stone (2008), Babb (2009),
and Kilby (2011). While it is undeniable that the U.S. does have informal
levers of power in these institutions, we would suggest that most of the
U.S.’s “informal” power at the IADB and World Bank is derived from its
formal veto power over changes to the Articles of Agreement and capital
structure. Other shareholders are well aware of this, and more inclined to
give the U.S. what it demands on major issues, particularly in the context
of a capital increase negotiation. Hence, in our view, formal shareholding
structures remain critical to deﬁning governance. This is supported by the
bitter disputes between members over even very small changes in voting
shares at many MDBs and the IMF. Nonetheless, we acknowledge that
formal voting structures cannot fully explain all aspects of MDB activities.
4. The CAF has more recently begun to expand membership beyond the
ﬁve countries, but we focus on these countries to provide a longer time
series for comparison.
5. Both the IADB and World Bank have “nonconcessional” and
“concessional” lending windows. The former is based on the MDB’s
borrowing costs (i.e., linked to market rates), while the latter is long
maturity and interest free or very low interest lending, that involves a very
large “aid” component as deﬁned by the OECD. We include concessional
lending in our data, but the amount to the countries and time period under
study is quite low (5.9% of IADB lending, almost entirely to Bolivia, and
7.2% of World Bank lending, entirely to Bolivia) and does not signiﬁcantly
impact the results. In other parts of the world where concessional lending
is a much higher share of total, notably sub-Saharan Africa, this sort of
demand-oriented analysis would be fundamentally diﬀerent.
6. In-depth, in-person interviews were conducted with current and
former oﬃcials in the ﬁnance and planning ministries, all of whom had
direct authority on borrowing decisions with MDBs. Peru interviews were
conducted in June 2009, Colombia in May/June 2012, and Ecuador in
June 2012. See Annex 1 for a complete list.
7. This may seem particularly surprising in the case of policy condition-
ality on budget support loans (as opposed to investment loans), which has
received considerable attention in academic literature. However, policy
conditions are much less binding now for borrower governments, at least
those in Latin America, because both the World Bank and IADB
speciﬁcally build loans around reforms that the government clearly wants
to do or is in fact already doing. This was reported by all oﬃcials
interviewed. As one Colombian oﬃcial said, “Policy loans are now
relatively easy for us to prepare, because they are using reforms that are
ready, the banks do not oblige or demand anything, practically. We sell
what we have done” (interview, June 6, 2012). An examination of policy-
based loans by the World Bank and IADB in recent years for the ﬁve
Andean countries makes it evident that the days of enforced privatizations
and removal of trade barriers are long gone—loan conditions relate to
low-proﬁle technical issues, such as tax policy changes, decentralization or
better targeting mechanisms for social spending programs. As well, some
ﬁnance ministry oﬃcials reported that they often collude with MDBs to
design policy conditionality in a way that serves their purposes in battles
with line ministries, similar to the dynamic reported by Vreeland (2003).
The CAF provides some budget support (frequently labeled as a “sectoral
investment loan”), but has never attached policy conditions.
8. “Intrinsic” factors such as capital adequacy and reserve ratios are
much less important than shareholder composition and guarantee callable
capital in deﬁning the rating, particularly for the World Bank and IADB.
As one former top World Bank ﬁnance oﬃcial wrote, “. . . ratings agencies
do not actually base their rating of the MDBs on the spurious
sophisticated and often confusing, if not almost irrelevant, ﬁnancial ratio
analysis they purport to impress their readership with. Instead, they now
appear to be basing their judgment solely on the strength of usable callable
capital” (Mistry, 1995, p. 73).
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9. CAF’s rating was A+/AA as of 2012, and its ratings have climbed
steadily over the past two decades. This improvement comes mainly as a
result of consistently strong ﬁnancial ratios such as high capital adequacy
and extraordinarily good repayment record (far better than the World
Bank and IADB), and also due to the fact the membership has expanded
in recent years (Moody’s, 2009; Standard and Poor’s, 2010).
10. These issues are explored in detail in Humphrey (2012a). Brieﬂy put,
nonborrowing shareholders at the World Bank are motivated to generate
higher net income through higher loan charges to (i) allocate to IDA and
hence reduce their own budgetary contributions; (ii) allocate to special
programs, many of which are of interest to nonborrowers more than
borrowers (for example, West Bank/Gaza reconstruction); and (iii) build
reserve to protect against any call on their guarantee capital and also to
build overall capital without the need for a politically diﬃcult capital
increase. As a result, loan charges and net income allocations are the topic
of constant disagreements among shareholders, as conﬁrmed by interviews
with 17 shareholder representatives at the IADB and World Bank for
Humphrey (2012a) and also discussed in Kapur (2002) and Mohammed
(2004). The greater power of borrowers at the IADB has limited these
allocations (FSO does not receive net income allocations, and special
programs are minimal), while in the CAF they essentially do not exist.
This explains why IADB loans are sometimes cheaper than the World
Bank’s despite a slightly higher funding cost, and why the CAF loans are
closer in cost to the other two MDBs than one might otherwise expect.
11. The World Bank and IADB loan terms are accessible on their
websites; CAF loan maturities were compiled and averaged from the 2010
and 2011 annual reports. CAF loans from earlier years would, if anything,
have shorter average maturities.
12. The analysis in this and the subsequent sub-sections are discussed
more fully in Humphrey (2012b).
13. Interestingly, of the three countries, Colombian oﬃcials were
somewhat more nuanced on the issue of safeguards. Oﬃcials complained
repeatedly about the very high additional costs and time occasioned by the
safeguards, and objected to the safeguards in principal as condescending
and unnecessary considering their own stringent laws. However, they
noted that the World Bank or IADB safeguards could provide useful
political cover when undertaking a sensitive project, for example building
a highway in an environmentally fragile area or through a region
populated by indigenous peoples.
14. In the literature on international development assistance, disburse-
ments are typically used in studies of aid eﬀectiveness, whereas commit-
ments are used to examine the motives of aid allocation or borrower
demand. See Berthe´lemy (2006) and McGillivray and White (1993) for
further discussions of the relative merits of commitments vs. disbursements.
15. An indicator tracking the interest rate faced by a government would
be ideal here, but this would involve ﬁnding out the interest rate a
government would have had to pay to borrow from private markets, for
both bonds and bank loans. This counter-factual cannot be realistically
constructed.
16. An ideal variable to better disentangle supply from demand eﬀects
would be the amount each MDB would have been willing to lend to each
country for each year—while this information does exist, it is unfortu-
nately not publicly available.
17. The bivariate correlation coeﬃcients between any two of these
variables except GDP per capita and reserves are above 20%, between the
investors’ ranking and GDP per capita, it is as high as 55%.
18. Given the results of a Hausman test, the inclusion of FE is clearly
indicated, and RE-estimation is biased. See Annex 2, Table A2, for a
comparison with a random eﬀects regression (Regression 1).
19. As further alternative to these speciﬁcations, we considered using the
Libor-based loan rates (Figure 2) directly as additional explanatory
variables. However, a reliable time series could not be constructed because
of comparability issues between loans oﬀered by diﬀerent MDBs in
diﬀerent time periods, as well as data shortcomings. As a test, we
constructed a new variable by taking the diﬀerence between the CAF and
the IBRD Libor rates (assuming that the IBRD rates approximately also
reﬂect those of the IADB as Figure 2 suggests), and it is positively and
signiﬁcantly correlated to IBRD lending (i.e., the higher the price of the
CAF, the higher IBRD lending), and this eﬀect reduces the eﬀect of the
general trend (year). Overall, this is consistent with our expectations.
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